



Latin Europe cluster: from South to North

Jorge Correia Jesuino¹

Instituto Superior de Ciencias do, Trabalho e da Empresa, Portugal

Abstract

The Latin Europe cluster consists of Spain, Portugal, Italy, French Switzerland, France, and Israel. The cluster has a total population of over 170 million and has a gross National income of close to U.S.\$3.5 trillion. The cluster scores close to mid-range on all the dimensions of societal practices except power distance, where it has a high cluster average of over 5. The cluster's values are particularly high on performance orientation, perhaps reflecting the participating managers' understanding of the implications of global competition. The key strategic dilemma for these societies seems to be how to balance the need for competitiveness with their traditional preference for a paternalistic and interventionist government. © 2002 Published by Elsevier Science Inc.

1. Introduction

The Latin Europe cluster comprises Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, French Switzerland and Israel. It is arguable whether Israel has been correctly classified. As explained by Gupta, Dorfman, Hanges & Brodbeck (in press) an alternative classification for Israel does not produce a more accurate statistical solution. But more substantive reasons can also be invoked beyond the technical analytic requirements. The authors suggest that Israel's inclusion in this cluster may be related to the fact that there was a strong Jewish community in Spain before they moved to Eastern European countries. It is plausible that they maintained their social and business ties with Latin Europe.

Latin Europe is in some ways the cradle of Europe. A number of scholars have celebrated the uniqueness of the Mediterranean miracle, where it all started. For Valéry (1939) and more recently by Derrida (1991), Europe is the outcome of a triple heritage: Athens, Rome and Jerusalem. Or, more specifically, of the Greek Rationalism that led to the creation of science and philosophy, of the Roman Law and the State Organization, and of the monotheistic Judeo-Christianism. For the French writer what is distinctive of

Europe is not the race, the language or the nationality but rather a common spirit whose main feature is a sort of hubris expressed in maximalist drives: "wherever the European spirit prevails, there emerges a maximum of *needs*, a maximum of *work*, a maximum of *ambition*, a maximum of *power*, a maximum of *change of the external nature*, a maximum of *relations* and *exchanges*" (Derrida, 1991). For Gadamer, another scholar that reflected about the identity of Europe (Gadamer, 1989), its distinctive trait is the heritage of the early Greek culture where religion, art, philosophy and science were separately cultivated and developed. This could also be interpreted in terms of a permanent will to change, to vary, to innovate, leading to progress. Popper (1988) stresses the role of "culture clashes" in the formation of European identity: Greeks against Asians, Greeks against Romans, Romans against Arabs—the European culture is marked by conflicts which have helped it learn from others while at the same time helping it solidify its unique features.

Writing within an international context it is fair to acknowledge that such encomiastic views can be considered as rather Eurocentric. Amartya Sen in his recent volume "Development as Freedom" (Sen, 1999), argues against this claim of "Western uniqueness." He produces evidence that ideas like individual freedom and tolerance can also be found in texts and practices of Asian societies while oppression and intolerance can be found in Western societies. The good and evil are apparently well distributed all over the world.

During the Roman Empire, Europe's power centered on the Mediterranean banks. Centuries later, the center of power

¹ Charles Henri Besseyre des Horts, Philippe Castel, Marc Deneire, Alexandre Kurc, Marie-Francoise Lacassagne, Christopher Leeds, Manfred Schmitz (France), Miriam Erez, Amir Rozen (Israel), Giuseppe Audia, Domenico Bodega (Italy), Celia Guterrez, Jeremiah O'Connell, Jose M. Prieto (Spain), Juergen Weibler, Rolf Wunderer (Switzerland).

of Europe traveled towards more Northern countries, replacing the dominant role of the Iberian states. The history of Europe is full of such displacement of hegemony among its nations; a history of “sound and fury”, of permanent political, religious and ideological wars, culminating in the two world conflicts that devastated the civilized world.

Latin European countries have since long lost the protagonism they enjoyed until the Renaissance period. The Mediterranean—through which the boats carrying statues and goods, navigated (Valéry, 1939), lost its power and influence when the Portuguese, triggered by the drive of going farther, started navigating towards the Atlantic. For some observers (Wallerstein, 2000), the first wave of globalization started at that time. Powerful for a while, the Iberian peoples started to decay along the 16th and 17th centuries. Italy at that time was not yet unified, but a collection of brilliant and prosperous city-states, among which was the powerful Vatican, the seat of the Catholic Church.

The reaction of the Northern centers against the corruption of the Church—the Reform movement, was also a major driver of the transition of power from the South to the North. Starting in the 16th century, England, France and the German states were to become the main centers of Europe, if not of the world. The South was looked down at, with suspicion, the “soft belly” as dubbed by Churchill during the second world war. This derogatory stereotype can also be observed even within nations: the Midi (South) in France, the Italian South (Sicilia and Calabria), and the Spanish South (Andaluzia). In the same vein and using the same geographical metaphors, cities like Barcelona (Spain) or Milan (Italy) dispute their role as the “capital of North of the South”.

Presumably one reason for this negative judgment about some of the Eurolatin countries could be the long period of condescendence with fascist regimes. This was the case of

Spain and Portugal where democratic regimes were formed only 30 years after the end of the second world war. Portugal in particular was the subject of strong international criticism for its obsolete colonial dominion in Africa. The political landscape started to change in Portugal in 1974, after a bloodless revolution, and in Spain in 1975, after the death of the dictator Franco.

The creation of the European Economic Community (Rome 1957) and, more recently, the European Union (Maastricht 1992) has had historical and far reaching consequences in terms of reducing the gaps between the North and the South not only among nations but also among regions. France and Italy now belong to the G7—the top seven of world economy, together with the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan and Canada. There are, of course, as will be shown later, visible disparities among the countries in the region.

1.1. Demographic and economic profile

Fig. 1 shows a map of the GLOBE countries in the Latin Europe cluster. The group spans a relatively small but continuous geographical area with the exception of Israel that, notwithstanding the GLOBE findings, is not easily dovetailed in the puzzle. To some extent Switzerland does not culturally fit with the Southern cluster but the French speaking part is apparently closer to the French than to the German culture. Other countries such as Belgium could also be included but they are not part of the GLOBE sample.

Important statistical information about the cluster's demographic and economic features is provided in Table 1. The largest countries in the cluster are France and Spain, followed by Italy. Portugal is a distant fourth. French Switzerland and Israel occupy tiny portions of territory that do not correspond to their political or economic



Fig. 1.

Table 1
Economic and demographic features^a

	Surface area (thousand square km)	Population (millions)	Life expectancy		Female ratio (% total)	GNI (U.S.\$ billions)	GNI (per capita)	GDP (%) (1980–90)	Growth (1990–99)	HDI (world ranking)
			Male	Female						
Italy	301	58	75	82	51.4	11629	20.17	2.4	1.4	20
Portugal	92	10	72	79	52.1	110.2	11.03	3.1	2.5	28
Spain	506	39	75	82	51.1	583.1	14.8	3	2.2	21
France	512	59	75	82	51.3	14532	24.17	2.4	1.5	13
French Switzerland	14	2.5	77	83	50.4	–	–	2	0.6	11
Israel	21	6	76	80	50.3	99.6	16.31	3.5	5.2	22
Cluster	1486	174.5	75	81	51.1	34010	17.296	2.7	2.2	High
World	133567	5978	65	69	49.3	299466	5.02	3.4	2.5	–
Cluster/World	0.01	0.03	1.15	1.17	1.03	0.11	3.45	–	0.89	–

Sources: World Development Indicators 2001, Human Development Report 2001.

^a GNI (Growth National Income): sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. GNI per capita: GNI divided by midyear population. GDP (Growth Domestic Product): the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of outputs. GDP per capita: GDP divided by midyear population. HDI: Human Development Index.

importance. Altogether the surface of the cluster amounts to a mere 1% of the world surface. In terms of population, the cluster accounts for 3% of the world population. France and Italy are the most populous countries in the cluster, with 59 and 58 million, respectively, followed by Spain with 39 million.

The information in Table 1 reinforces the picture of high economic development but also reveals important differences between the various countries within the cluster. France and Italy come first, ranking as fourth and the sixth world economies, respectively. Spain ranks as the 10th world economy. In global terms, the cluster represents 11% of the world gross national income. In terms of gross national income *per capita*, the cluster average is almost four-fold the world average. France and Italy rank in the 21st and the 29th positions, respectively. Israel, Spain and Portugal lag behind. All countries in the cluster also rank very favorably in terms of the Human Development Index, ranging from 11th for French Switzerland to 28th for Portugal. Life expectancy is quite above the world average. Males have an average expectancy of 75 years and females of 81 years.

2. Global and local issues

With the ever growing trend toward globalization, the American model of economic liberalism is without rival in its impact on governments' views towards economic and social progress. Many countries are now following similar paths towards economic prosperity. There are certainly many signs that Europe is steadfastly adhering to this model. But it can also be argued that the EU is attempting to find an alternative to the American capitalism. The central issue turns around the role of the state. That is, the divide between the state and civil society. The European tradition grants a more interventionist role to the state than in the U.S. But even in Europe, the situation is far from being the same everywhere. Whereas Scandinavian as well as Latin societies tend towards a more paternalistic approach, the Anglo Saxon model is much closer to, if not the original inspirer of the American model.

The case of France is particularly telling. Inspired by Charles DeGaulle, if not long before him, French rulers manifest a deep suspicion towards whatever comes from America, starting with its economic and cultural models. As summarized by the present premier Jospin, France has adhered to a "market economy" but not to a "market society". The big challenge is thus, to find that *troisième voie* combining economic success with social justice. That implies a sustained intervention of the state—the *dirigiste* model, in order to correct the market failures. Such a policy is generally reflected in economic and financial indicators such as government spending, taxation, welfare system, size of public service, among many others.

To a certain extent, the *dirigiste* model has also been adopted by the EU, which is often criticized for being

heavily bureaucratic. France was one of the most active partners in the building of the present European Union and always had an important influence in its architecture. The extent to which the *dirigiste* model was also adopted by other Latin societies such as Italy, Spain and Portugal is a complex question exacerbated by the high rate of societal change in these countries.

According to some observers, the French alternative, although successful so far, is too expensive to be maintained. There are many signs suggesting that behind the rhetoric, the reality shows the inexorable trend towards more pragmatic measures. The present socialist government of "Mr. Jospin has put up for sale state owned enterprises whose worth is more than his five most recent predecessors put together" (The Economist, 1999, June 5th, p. 4). The case of Italy presents its own peculiarities. One of its most salient features is the number and dynamism of small family companies, flexible, able to quickly adapt to the demands of the market. Being family firms they enjoy high morale and loyalty, similar to what can be observed in Chinese overseas societies. At the macro societal level, governments are weak and the tax systems are rather complex and lack transparency and largely circumvented by the taxpayers. Italy seems to be looking to the North, ready to espouse the neo-liberal recipes of success that might finally lead to a more balanced society.

Spain is another story of success if we take into account its backward situation only 25 years ago. The same can also be said of Portugal notwithstanding the structural weaknesses of its economy and human resources. In both cases, an enormous effort has been put into reducing the gap between them and the most advanced European countries. Once again part of this success was due to the adoption of the liberal way of privatization, reduction of the role of the state, and reinforcing the civil society.

In summary, what appears as distinctive and peculiar of the countries in the Latin European cluster is the paternalistic role attributed to the state, expecting it to regulate, educate and protect its subjects. As we shall see, this corresponds to an emphasis on collectivism rather than individualism. The changes taking place all over the world triggered by competitiveness are challenging all collectivistic societies. Whether they are able to achieve the demands of economic progress without incurring the risks of abandoning people to their own fate is what remains to be seen.

Notwithstanding its political and cultural differences, Israel also seems to adhere to the general turn of the South towards the North. Israel is another astonishing story of success. In economic terms, the country has succeeded in raising its GDP to more than U.S.\$16,000, higher than Portugal and Spain. Its political and economic system, although inspired at the outset by socialistic tenets with its kibbutz collective farms, has gradually come to adopt the free-market Western model. But Israel also faces serious problems not only related with the permanent conflicts at its borders, but also within its own society. To a certain extent, Israel is still a nation in progress. Born as a state 50 years

ago, it received successive waves of immigrants arriving from all parts of the world. In terms of population, now around 6 million, it is another melting pot of Askhenazim (Western Jews) and Sephardim (Oriental Jews). The most recent wave amounts to 70,000 coming from Russia. But the Israeli community is far from being cohesive. The conflict between the orthodox Heradim and the secular, between the church and the state is dividing the Israeli society and threatening its ideological unity at a time when the current political debate, very much like the older European countries, tends to focus more and more on economic issues and the impact of globalization.

3. Findings from GLOBE data

As part of the GLOBE Research Program, middle managers from firms in 61 societies were asked to report cultural practices and values in their countries. The managers also rated effectiveness of alternative leader behaviors. The nine cultural dimensions and the leader profiles are explained in detail in House et al. (1999). In the following pages, we will present the findings on societal practices and organizational cultures, and alternative models for outstanding leadership.

3.1. Societal practices and values in latin Europe cluster

Fig. 2 and Table 2 show the scores on the nine dimensions of societal culture. The scores here are the average of the individual scores aggregated at the society level. The means of societies are then averaged to obtain the cluster scores.

As it can be seen in Fig. 2, the cluster's societal practices are rated as high on power distance (5.21) and relatively high on group and family collectivism (4.8). Gender egalitarianism obtained the lowest score (3.36) followed by future orientation (3.68). The remaining dimensions are on the mid range, around an average of 4. Compared to the overall globe practices, with the exception of power distance and uncer-

tainty avoidance, the cluster's scores tend to be lower. The profile obtained suggests a high perception of power distance, a moderate emphasis on uncertainty avoidance, collectivism (both group and institutional), assertiveness and performance orientation and a lower emphasis on future orientation and gender egalitarianism. The high score on power distance may have something to do with the strong presence of the Catholic Church in these countries.

As for the values (should-be) the cluster rates high on performance orientation (5.94), group collectivism (5.66), future orientation (5.33), and humane orientation (5.58) and scores very low on power distance (2.57). These scores do not greatly differ from the averages obtained with the 61 countries. Comparing the cluster's societal practices and values, the participating managers seem to prefer dramatic reductions in "power distance" along with significant increases in performance orientation, humane orientation, future orientation and gender egalitarianism. But perhaps more revealing is the relatively narrow distance between "as is" and "should-be" scores on "uncertainty avoidance" and "assertiveness". This would suggest that respondents in the cluster consider their societies as acceptable in terms of structure and rules and in terms of their assertiveness.

The respondents seem to prefer a modest increase in group as well as institutional collectivism. It is also apparent that respondents seem sensitive to the pressures of competition, which implies more "future" and more "performance" orientation, but balanced with more "humane" and gender egalitarian ideals.

It is important to note that while the cluster scores reflect an overall picture, they do mask potential country differences. A closer inspection of Table 2 indicates the differences across the countries in terms of societal of practices. Italy, Portugal and Spain form a sort of sub-cluster, contrasting with the sub-cluster of France and French Switzerland. Israel shows mixed scores. Such differences, although relatively minor, could be explained by historical, social and economical reasons. Spain and Portugal are not so highly developed as France or Switzerland. They joined the




Fig. 2. Latin Europe cluster's societal culture scores.

Table 2
Country means for GLOBE societal culture dimensions

	Italy	Portugal	Spain	France	Switzerland	Israel	Cluster	GLOBE
Uncertainty avoidance								
As	3.79	3.91	3.92	4.43	4.98	4.01	4.18	4.16
Should	4.47	4.43	4.76	4.26	3.83	4.38	4.36	4.62
Future orientation								
As	3.25	3.71	3.51	3.48	4.27	3.85	3.68	3.85
Should	5.91	5.43	5.63	4.96	4.8	5.25	5.33	5.48
Power distance								
As	5.43	5.44	5.52	5.28	4.86	4.73	5.21	5.16
Should	2.47	2.38	2.26	2.76	2.8	2.72	2.57	2.74
Institutional collectivism								
As	3.28	3.92	3.85	3.93	4.22	4.46	4.01	4.25
Should	5.13	5.3	5.2	4.86	4.31	4.27	4.84	4.73
Humane orientation								
As	3.63	3.11	3.32	3.4	3.93	4.1	3.71	4.09
Should	5.58	5.31	5.69	5.67	5.62	5.62	5.58	5.42
Performance orientation								
As	3.58	3.6	4.01	4.11	4.25	4.08	3.94	4.1
Should	6.07	6.4	5.8	5.65	5.98	5.75	5.94	5.94
Family collectivism								
As	4.94	5.55	5.45	4.37	3.85	4.7	4.8	5.13
Should	5.72	5.94	5.79	5.42	5.35	5.75	5.66	5.66
Gender egalitarianism								
As	3.24	3.66	3.01	3.64	3.42	3.19	3.36	3.37
Should	4.88	5.13	4.82	4.4	4.69	4.71	4.77	4.51
Assertiveness								
As	4.07	3.65	4.42	4.13	3.47	4.23	3.99	4.14
Should	3.82	3.58	4	3.38	3.78	3.76	3.72	3.82

European Communities at a more recent date. But each country has its own peculiarities. A more detailed comparison is provided.

4. Uncertainty avoidance

This is related to the tendency toward orderliness and consistency, structured lifestyles, clear specification of social expectations, and rules and laws to cover situations. Within the cluster, it is French Switzerland and France that score higher as compared with all the remaining countries. In terms of values a reversal is observed. While Italy, Portugal, Spain and Israel would wish an increase in this dimension, French Switzerland and France would prefer a decrease. In the Southern sub-cluster, the respondents believe their societies are not sufficiently structured while the Northern sub-clusters would prefer more flexibility. The present cluster's results also confirm that countries that perceive themselves as more structured are also more prosperous in terms of consumption and growth. They are also more competitive and more productive.

5. Future orientation

Future orientation was defined in the GLOBE project as the degree to which a collectivity encourages and rewards future oriented behaviors such as planning and delaying gratification (House et al., 1999). At the level of practices, it was French Switzerland and Israel who scored high. Italy, France, Spain and Portugal are all in a lower band. The negative correlation found between practices and values (Ashkanasy, Mayfield, & Trevor-Roberts, 2002), also observed in this cluster, indicates that the lower the score on practices, the more the participants prefer a stronger future orientation, and thus, the higher their value scores. The difference between the practices and values in the case of French Switzerland is only 0.53 while in Italy it amounts at 2.70.

6. Power distance

Power distance is defined as “the degree to which members of an organization or society expect and agree that power should be shared unequally”. The findings of the

Latin European cluster indicate that managers perceive power distance practices to be very high and would prefer much lower levels. The cluster mean difference between practices and values for the cluster is 2.64. Spain, Portugal, Italy and France, all in the same band, have the highest scores. According to d'Iribarne (1997), who conducted an ethnographic research in France, United States and The Netherlands, the "French logic" is still more dependent on the arbitrary decisions of the rulers than on the rationality of the law. d'Iribarne cites Crozier (1962), a French sociologist who in 1962 in his seminal work—"The Bureaucratic Phenomenon", presented a picture of the French bureaucracy where the whims of those in positions of power superseded the mediation of norms and rules. In French Switzerland and Israel, power seems to be shared more equally. The lower scores in Israel could be attributed to the atypical situation of permanent war mobilization.

As suggested by Carl and Gupta (in press), Catholic societies, especially the ones that have experienced low growth in private consumption during recent years, such as Spain and Portugal, tend to strongly reject the values of power distance, and favor power distance reduction. The authors further suggest that societies with a large, established middle class would have a lower level of power distance than societies with a newly emerging middle class, such as the Iberian countries. It is, however, worth noting that class composition is changing very fast. From 1986 to 1997, according to the Eurostat, professions like entrepreneurs and professionals increased between 7 and 10 points in the various countries of the European Union. In 1997, the percentage of the "middle class" jumped in the EU to 38%, although important difference still persist between countries: In France 38%, in Italy 34%, in Spain 25% and in Portugal 25%. Such changes will certainly contribute to significant differences in the ways of using power. Participation in decision making will tend to be even more frequent in institutions and organizations.

7. Humane orientation

GLOBE's concept of "humane orientation" is defined as the degree to which an organization or society encourages and rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others (House et al., 1999). The Latin European cluster scored relatively low (3.71), below the GLOBE grand mean (4.09) at the level of practices, and relatively high (5.58) at the level of values. The cluster countries are consistent in terms of the preferred level of humane orientation but the difference between values and practices is particularly large for Spain and France.

8. Performance orientation

In the GLOBE Research Program, "performance orientation" is related both to the issues of external adaptation and

internal integration (Javidan, in press; Schein, 1992). It is an internally consistent set of practices and values which have an impact on the way a society defines success in adapting to external challenges, and the way the society manages the interrelationships among its people. According to the findings, societies higher on performance orientation at the level of practices (as is) tend to be economically more successful and globally more competitive, and tend to enjoy a more positive attitude towards life and live in a more civil society" (Javidan, in press). In contrast, the societies scoring higher on performance orientation values (should-be) tend to be less competitive, less economically productive, more satisfied with their work lives, and more strongly religious oriented (Javidan, in press).

In the Latin European cluster, the scores on performance orientation practices range from a high of 4.25 (French Switzerland) to a low of 3.58 (Italy). Portugal has the second lowest score at 3.6. All the cluster countries score high on the value dimension, reflecting strong aspirations for higher performance orientation.

9. Gender egalitarianism

The concept of "gender egalitarianism" is defined as the way in which societies divide rules between women and men. More gender egalitarian societies believe that men and women are suited for similar roles, whereas less gender egalitarian societies believe that men and women should assume different roles (Emrich & Denmark, 2002).

The Latin European cluster is reported to be generally male oriented in terms of its practices. Spain (3.01) is the most and Portugal (3.66) is the least male-oriented country. Portugal also has the highest values score (5.13) while France (4.4) has the lowest score on values. The scores on values seem to suggest that gender egalitarianism is now a more popular concept, even in Catholic conservative countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. While the cluster's percentage of women in ministerial functions is 19.5% and in parliament is 17.4%, the number of women in higher education far exceeds the number of male students.

10. Collectivism

Institutional collectivism refers to the degree to which institutional practices at the societal level encourage and reward collective action. Family collectivism, on the other hand, is defined as the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty and interdependence in their families and close associates (Gelfand, Bhawak, Nishii, & Bechtold, in press).

Within the Latin European cluster, the countries scoring higher on institutional collectivism are Israel and French Switzerland whereas countries scoring higher on family collectivism are Portugal and Spain. The latter two countries, along with Italy desire a much higher degree of institutional collectivism.




Fig. 3. Latin Europe cluster's leadership profiles scores.

11. Outstanding leadership in the cluster

The GLOBE Program identified 23 leadership styles that were deemed effective in one or more cultures of the world. Using second order factor analysis, five distinct leadership models were formulated and the first was split into two (charismatic and group oriented) for theoretical consistency. The individual scores were aggregated to the society level, and society scores were averaged to the cluster level. Both Fig. 3 and Table 3 show the cluster mean of this model of outstanding leadership.

As seen in the Fig. 3, charismatic visionary (5.74), team-oriented (5.86) and participative leadership (5.48) are considered as the most effective leadership attributes in Latin European countries. Charismatic consists of such attributes as visionary, inspirational, self-sacrificial, integrity, decisiveness and performance orientation. Team-oriented leadership comprises team orientation, team integration, diplomacy, malevolence (reversed score) and administrative competence. These factors were found to be universally endorsed, i.e., not only in Europe, but globally as contributing to effective leadership (Den Hartog et al., 1999). Next in importance is the humane leadership (4.24). Relatively less valued are autonomous (3.70) and self-protective leadership (3.19).

Compared to overall GLOBE scores, the Latin Europe scores are lower on self-protective, autonomous, and humane, and slightly higher on participative leadership. A comparison of the cluster country means shows that France presents the lowest scores on all attributes except participative leadership where along with French Switzerland, the score is higher than in other countries within the cluster. To French managers, being a humane leader actually impedes effective leadership. Charismatic leadership, while seen in somewhat positive light, is not viewed as highly as in the other countries. Effective French organizational leaders are first and foremost participative, and to a lesser extent team oriented.

12. Final remarks

The world of today is becoming more uniform and more converging, at least in terms of political and economic rules. The old Europe is not immune. The creation of the European Union was a very important event that contributed to economic development of countries such as Spain and Portugal. Large asymmetries between nations still exist but the gap is rapidly diminishing. Notwithstanding the world convergence, Europe still strives for its own sense of uniqueness,

Table 3
Country and cluster means for GLOBE second-order leadership scales

	Charismatic I (Visionary)	Team-Oriented	Self-Protective	Participative	Humane	Autonomous
Cluster	5.74	5.83	3.19	5.48	4.24	3.7
GLOBE	5.83	5.76	3.45	5.35	4.77	3.86
Italy	5.98	5.87	3.26	5.47	4.04	3.62
Portugal	5.75	5.92	3.11	5.48	4.45	3.19
Spain	5.9	5.93	3.39	5.11	4.59	3.54
France	4.93	5.11	2.82	5.9	3.29	3.32
French Switzerland	5.9	5.62	2.93	5.94	4.68	4.02
Israel	6.23	5.91	3.64	4.96	4.44	4.26

trying to create a more balanced compromise between the market imperatives and social equality. This balancing act has generated much debate on the role of government. The conventional wisdom seems to be that the welfare state and the paternalistic rulers are to evolve to less protectionist forms. A close look at the Euro Latin societies has suggested that the construct of collectivism differentiated in the modalities of institutional versus family, could be helpful for mapping organizations and societies and also to understand their underlying dynamics. Maybe the challenge for the future is just how to achieve the necessary balance between collective good and personal freedom that keep societies moving smoothly.

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